events surrounding Halley's failed attempt to secure the Savilian Professorship in Astronomy at Oxford in 1691.
HALLEY AND ETERNALISM IN THE EARLY 1690S
Let us quickly recapitulate the known evidence. In June 1691-upon being presented by Peter Mews, bishop of Winchester, to the lucrative rectory of Brightwell, BerkshireEdward Bernard (1638-97) announced his intention to resign from Oxford's Savilian Professorship of Astronomy. 4 Halley-who had been touted as a successor to Bernard as early as 1678 5 -immediately put himself forward, alongside David Gregory and John 
D. Levitin
Caswell. At this point, doubts about Halley's religious orthodoxy began to spread. On 22 June Halley wrote to his friend Abraham Hill, a central figure in the Royal Society who was also much interested in debates concerning the compatibility of natural philosophy and Genesis, stating:
An affair of great consequence to myself calls me to London, viz. looking after the Astronomy-Professor's place in Oxford, I humbly beg of you to intercede for me with the archbishop Dr. Tillotson, to defer the election for some short time, 'till I have done here [Pagham, where Halley was assisting in the salvage of some sunken cargo], if it be but for a fortnight: but it must be done with expedition, lest it be too late to speak. This time will give me an opportunity to clear myself in another matter, there being a caveat entered against me, till I can shew that I am not guilty of asserting the eternity of the world. 6 There is nothing whatsoever in Halley's career preceding this moment that explains this rumour; neither is it clear from whom it emerged (see further below). 7 Hill was at this point comptroller to John Tillotson, Archbishop of Canterbury, who was also head of the appointments committee for the Savilian chairs. The usual account of what followed, relying on testimonies from several decades later by John Hough, Thomas Hearne and William Whiston, claims that Halley was interviewed independently by Tillotson, Edward Stillingfleet (Bishop of Worcester) and Richard Bentley (then Stillingfleet's chaplain), responding with such colourful answers as 'I declare myself a Christian and hope to be treated as such' or that he 'belieued a God and that was all'. 8 All this is highly dubious-some rather more solid evidence about the events of 1691 will be presented below.
On 11 November Halley obtained a letter of recommendation for the job from the Royal Society. 9 But Gregory had a recommendation from Newton. 10 By Christmas Eve, Christopher Wren could report that Gregory had been elected. 11 In the meantime, Halley had read (on 25 November) to the Society a paper on terrestrial magnetism, offering a four-pole theory that posited a second concentric sphere (and perhaps more) within the Earth (Michael Dahl's portrait of Halley in the Royal Society shows him holding a sketch of his multi-shell model). Consequently, he speculated on whether the 'internal earth' might be inhabitable, suggesting that 'there are severall other means of producing light' beyond the Sun 'which may be sufficient to illuminate these internall Spheres' and that 'for warmth it is certain, that there is continuall temperature deep underground.' 12 I can see no evidence for Schaffer's claim that 'Halley produced his first suggestion of his proof that the world must come to an end in the final section' of this paper. 13 In another paper read on 2 December, however, Halley did suggest that it was 'the wisdom of the Creator' that had 'provided for . . . the means . . . of producing light'.
14 It was only on 27 January 1692, after the result of the Savilian election had been announced, that Halley next spoke on the subject, and this paper was 'ordered to be inserted in the [Philosophical] Transactions', appearing as the final article in volume 16. 15 Here Halley offered several encomia to the wisdom of the Creator in facilitating life in the subterraneous sphere, 16 culminating in a precise methodological statement:
And whereas I have adventured to make these Subterraneous Orbs capable of being inhabited, 'twas done designedly for the sake of those who will be apt to ask cui bono, and with whom Arguments drawn from Final Causes prevail much.
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These physico-theological passages are not discussed by Schaffer, who instead focuses on the final paragraph, in which Halley argued that his hypothesis solved another problem: now that the partially hollow Earth could be shown to have a smaller specific gravity than the moon, their synchronized motion was explicable, 'for otherwise the Earth would leave the Moon behind it, and she become another Primary Planet.' 18 Halley was here building on a (highly erroneous) calculation in the first edition of Newton's Principia about the relative masses of the Earth and the Moon. 19 But he disagreed with Newton about the resistance offered by outer space to moving bodies; where Newton had considered it negligible, Halley-based partly on Ole Rømer's recent measurement of the speed of light-believed that the aether effected a measurable drag on objects passing through it, including the planets. 20 This idea-the very strong nonNewtonianism of which is worth underlining-was elaborated in the important paper read to the Society on 19 October 1692, 'Concerning the Motion of Light'. The Earth should be slowing down, and the years getting longer. But this was not evident from the ancient astronomical observations of the Chaldeans (ca. 750 BC) as cited in Ptolemy, Hipparchus (ca. 150 BC) and al-Battānī (ca. 900 AD). Ingeniously, Halley solved this by claiming that they had modified their observations to create an artificial concord: Ptolemy, for example, was 'obliged to suppose Babylon nearer to Alexandria by about half an hour than the same author in his Geography hath placed it.' 21 Now, this had a fundamental theological consequence: 'the Ether obstructing the progressive motion of the Earth will not allow eternity to it or any of the Planets' as according to Proposition 15 of the second volume of Principia a logarithmic spiral will ensue, 'and at length [they] must be swallowed up in the Sun'. 'Hence,' Halley triumphantly declared, will necessarily follow the necessity of that Act of Creation and that these Globes of the Planets were not only formed with a wonderful and incomprehensible designe and contrivance as well as power to Execute, and that the motion they now have was impressed upon them at first in much more proportionate Distances and with such Degrees of Swiftness as may Enable them to subsist many millions of years but that they should not be capable of eternity in the state they now are. 22 Eternalism had been defeated; the Creation saved. Halley was ordered to 'prosecute this Notion, and to publish a discourse about it'; 23 however, nothing occurred until 18 October 1693, when Halley presented a new paper on the subject, entitled 'Some observations on the motion of the sun'.
THE LECTURE OF 18 OCTOBER 1693
That paper is the key to Schaffer's revisionist interpretation. Let us quote in full the summary from the Royal Society's Journal Book:
Halley read a Paper of his own, concerning a Demonstration of the Contraction of the year, and promising to make out thereby the necessity of the worlds coming to an end, and consequently that it must have had a beginning, which hitherto has not been evinced from any thing, that has been observed in Nature. Of this he was ordered to print a Dissertation. 24 The only thing that appears to have changed is that Halley now believed that the year was getting shorter rather than longer: the crucial theological conclusion, meanwhile, remained intact. But, on Schaffer's reading, this lecture 'has been the object of D. Levitin considerable confusion, mainly because the report of its content in the Journal Book for 18 October 1693, on which all previous analyses of this paper have been based, does not in fact completely tally with the manuscript version I have reproduced'-that is to say the account in the seventh volume of the Royal Society's Register Book. The account there confirms why Halley changed his mind on the duration of the year and did not publish his original lecture, as instructed: 'coming more nicely to consider it I found that instead of a slower motion in the Sun it became more swift', a change explicable by the Earth's coming closer to the Sun as it traversed its logarithmic spiral, 'which will perfectly render an account of the Phenomenon. ' 25 But Schaffer also assigns to Halley a much more spectacular change of mind: 'although it is the case that Halley does announce that the length of the year is getting less rather than greater, that is, that the Earth is accelerating in a spiral towards the sun, he does not conclude that the world must therefore come to an end.' 26 What is the evidence for this remarkable conclusion? Schaffer announces that 'the final words of the paper deserve some emphasis'; they are:
If the Honble Society shall command me to explain this matter as difficult as it is, and requiring the greatest [space for single word] both of [space for single word] and Geometry to make it out I shall endeavour if possible to make it intelligible, there still wanting a valid argument to evince from what has been observed in nature that this Globe of the Earth ever did begin or ever shall have an end. 27 Yet when Schaffer quotes the final clause in the body of his text, he makes a subtle alteration:
There [is] still wanting a valid argument to evince from what has been observed in Nature that this Globe of the Earth ever did begin or ever shall have an end.
He then concludes:
Since Halley did read this paper to the Royal Society, this demonstrates that Halley did not, after 1693, sheepishly toe the orthodox line on the age of the Earth. . . . This is crucial in a reassessment of his position on the relation of theology and natural philosophy. 28 This, it seems to me, is a fundamental misreading of the evidence. The insertion of '[is]' into the passage to suggest that an anti-eternalist argument had still to be developed after Halley's lecture is unwarranted. What Halley meant is that such an argument had not been developed until his lecture-just as the initial Journal Book clearly states. Even if the language were more ambiguous, it would surely be preferable to rely on the interpretation of the author of the Journal Book entry, who had actually heard the lecture. But we can clearly recreate Halley's meaning even from the words of the Register Book entry. If we were to insert any parenthetical clarification into the passage at all (although I am not convinced that any is required), it would look something like this: 'There still wanting [until now] a valid argument to evince from what has been observed in Nature that this globe of the Earth ever did begin or ever shall have an end. ' Schaffer's reading has been widely accepted in the historiography, and his parenthetical insertion frequently redeployed. Sara J. Schechner changes his present-tense '[is]' into the past-tense '[was]', claiming that 'Halley confessed that "there still [was] wanting a valid argument to evince from what has been observed in nature that this Globe of the Earth ever did begin or ever shall have an end".' (She then develops an elaborate socio-political reading of Halley that depends almost entirely on this misunderstanding.) 29 James
Halley and the eternity of the world revisited E. Force confines himself to Schaffer's present tense. 30 And even William Poole, undoubtedly the world's leading scholar of the whole late-seventeenth-century controversy over the age of the world, has claimed that 'only two years after the troubles over eternalism [i.e. the Savilian election], Halley was unrepentant, asserting at the end of a paper before the society: "there still [is] wanting a valid argument to evince from what has been observed in nature that this Globe of the Earth ever did begin or ever shall have an end".' 31 Others have accepted Schaffer's conclusions without quoting the passage either in the original or in his emended version. 32 
THE EVENTS OF 1691: A NEW ACCOUNT
The claim that Halley's 'pessimistic conclusion to the paper of 1693 . . . is scarcely the statement of a man worried by an accusation of Aristotelian heresy' 33 is thus unsustainable: on the contrary, the conclusion is optimistic about the possibility of disproving precisely that heresy. But where does that leave our account of Halley's heterodoxy and its connection to the 1691 competition for the Savilian Astronomy Chair?
Here, newly recovered evidence is of some significance. It will be recalled that the standard story-based on much later testimony-posits a series of colourful interviews with Tillotson, Stillingfleet and Bentley some time in the autumn of 1691. Nicolas Fatio de Duillier wrote to Christiaan Huygens on 9 May/29 April 1692 to say that Halley had lost 'à cause des opinions qu'on lui a voulu imputer sur la Religion.' 34 Halley's fullest biographer-rightly sceptical of the value of the later testimonies-has stated that this 'seems to be the only contemporary reference to Halley's views. ' 35 This is incorrect, for there exist several letters in the Bodleian Library in Oxford between the outgoing incumbent of the Savilian Chair, Edward Bernard, and his friend of long standing, the antiquary Thomas Smith, which shed significant light on the episode. On -who at that point was Henry Compton. Bernard, however, was not optimistic. This did not stop him from writing on Halley's behalf (the contender 'known for virtue' for whom he had not yet written was surely Caswell). This in itself is an interesting fact: Bernard, a high-church Anglican who was extremely sceptical about the recent attempts of natural philosophers to act as scriptural exegetes, 40 either did not believe the rumours of Halley's impiety or considered them less important than his astronomical ability. But Smith shared Bernard's pessimism about Halley's prospects, for in his reply of 11 July he wrote:
I am very sorry, that M r H[a]ly his Skeptikall and Atheisticall discourse has rendred himselfe so obnoxious to the just censure of the world: & I believe there is such a deep prejudice against him, that it will put him wholly by his pretensions of succeeding you: for w ch otherwise by reason of his excellent Skill in Astronomy and sober Mathematical learning hee is so highly qualifyed. 41 Halley, then, not only seemed unlikely to get the chair because of reports of his heterodoxy, but was also not even eligible to apply. However, he clearly spent his autumn productively, for when he next appears in the correspondence on 5 December (by this point Bernard had formally resigned), we hear from Smith: Contrary to Bernard and Smith's expectations, Halley had succeeded (or at least so Smith-by this point based in London and generally well informed about such thingsbelieved) in obtaining an affidavit from Compton, despite the calumnies of his opponents, one of whom seems to have been Flamsteed (more on this below). A week later, however, Smith's opinion had changed again:
I pray look upon the Last Philosophical Transactions, where M r Halley pretends to play the Critick: but his corruption of Suidas, as to the measure of a Saros, is grosse & justly to be condemned. I beeleive hee will meet with some difficulty in getting the degree of M. D. the prejudices run so high against him. of w ch in a little time you will be able to informe mee. 43 The first half of this passage refers to some emendations to the Suda suggested by Halley in a recent article on Pliny's Natural History in Philosophical Transactions; 44 it is the second that is of interest to us, for here Smith reveals (i) that Halley was still seeking to secure the DM degree, so close to the Savilian election, and (ii) that Bernard was particularly well This is a remarkable piece of evidence. We see that Halley went directly to the holder of the chair in what appears a desperate final attempt to convince Tillotson, who was chairing the appointments committee. We have confirmation-the word 'againe'-that Bernard had already written on Halley's behalf. And we see that Tillotson by this point seems to have stopped considering Halley as a candidate, for his 'order' to Bernard did not mention him. Unfortunately, we do not know what occurred with Halley's quest to obtain a DM. But just as interesting is the fact that Tillotson was requesting Bernard's opinion about his successor-evidently late-seventeenth-century professorial appointments were no less 'informally' conducted than modern ones.
Let us, then, summarize what can be known about the events of 1691. On 22 June Halley wrote to Hill about rumours of his impiety-specifically his belief in the eternity of the world-declaring his intention to clear them and asking Hill to ask Tillotson to defer the election. Before the end of that month, Hooke was telling Smith that Halley intended to go for the job, and Bernard in turn telling Smith that Halley could not get the job not only because of the rumours but also because they would preclude him from obtaining the appropriate qualifications. Smith soon confirmed that there was 'a deep prejudice against ' Halley. Yet by December Halley had seemingly secured Compton's testimony to his orthodoxy and still had hope of obtaining the DM. However, a week later Smith believed that the DM was unattainable because of the 'prejudices' against Halley-this seems to be confirmed by the lack of any evidence for Halley's even being considered for the degree. Another five days later, Bernard confirmed that Halley's attempts at the chair had failed, for he was not included in Tillotson's final 'shortlist'. Within another week and a half, Gregory had the job.
Two major conclusions can be drawn. First, there is no mention in any of this of interviews with Tillotson, Stillingfleet or Bentley; indeed, it is unclear why the last two would have been involved at all-despite repeated claims in the historiography, there is no evidence that Stillingfleet was on the appointments committee (according to the statutes, there is no reason for him to have been). The key clerical actor (apart from Tillotson's continued indirect importance) seems to have been Compton, who-if he had any initial scepticism-was soon convinced of Halley's orthodoxy. Second, the nature of the accusations against Halley is somewhat crystallized. In his biography of Halley, Alan Cook discusses who lodged the caveat against him, concluding that 'it must have been Flamsteed' and that 'there can be little doubt that Flamsteed was responsible for the caveat, for he effectively claimed it himself.' 46 The evidence adduced for this-a note appended by Flamsteed to a letter from John Wallis in December 1698-does not warrant these confident assertions, because in it Flamsteed says nothing other than that he supported Gregory and opposed Halley when they were 'competitors'. 47 However, Smith's letter of 5 December does seem to imply that Flamsteed was one of those accusing Halley-of course, this would not be the last time, even to Smith. 48 But the other letters make it clear that Halley had many other accusers, not least in Oxford. It remains unclear D. Levitin who entered the 'caveat' against him referred to in his letter to Hill; however, it was not that caveat but a more widespread intransigence on the part of a much wider group of people that scuppered his attempt to secure the astronomy professorship.
HALLEY AND THE ETERNITY OF THE WORLD
Schaffer's position is that Halley 'made public his own debate over . . . the eternity of the world'; as we have seen, this judgement is not supported by the evidence. Nonetheless, Halley certainly did hold opinions that would have been considered heterodox by almost all of his contemporaries. Here the evidence has been well known for some time, so we may cover it quickly, correcting some other historiographical errors as we go.
Despite being instructed to do so, Halley again did not publish the lecture of October 1693; instead he delivered on 25 October and 8 November two more lectures on putative errors in al-Battānī's observations; the conclusions were soon published in Philosophical Transactions, without any reference to questions about the world's age. 49 However, he returned to the subject a year later in a lecture 'About the Cause of the Universal Deluge' read to the Society on 12 December 1694. Halley advanced a theory of periodic catastrophism; specifically, he suggested-two years before a similar idea was put forward by William Whiston-that the Flood was caused by a comet. 50 A week later, after conversations with 'a Person whose Judgement I have great Reason to Respect', Halley suggested that 'what I . . . advanced, ought rather to be understood of those Changes which might possibly have reduc'd a former World to Chaos': the unnamed person was surely not Newton, as suggested by Schaffer, but Hooke, whose own theory-developed in lectures given since the late 1660s-much more closely resembled Halley's. 51 Schaffer is certainly wrong to claim that in these later lectures 'Halley was prepared to question the finite age of the Earth in public' 52 -Halley simply did no such thing. He did advance a theory of the partial corruption of the biblical text that was by then only mildly controversial. 53 But it was his idea that the great catastrophic changes had preceded the chaos that was utterly radical, as William Poole summarizes: 'in other words . . . there was a world before this one . . . Genesis therefore recorded the creation of a new geography out of an old landscape.' It is this, and only this (and certainly not 'Halley's empirical approach' 54 ) that marked Halley's lectures out as particularly outré and led him to ask for the suppression of their publication (they finally appeared in Philosophical Transactions in 1724). That he was going beyond any other natural philosopher is confirmed by the opening of a subsequent lecture on measuring gradual changes in the salinity of the seas, published in Philosophical Transactions in 1715:
There have been many Attempts made and Proposals offered, to ascertain from the Appearances of Nature, what may have been the Antiquity of this Globe of Earth; on which, by the Evidence of Sacred Writ, Mankind has dwelt about 6000 Years; or according to the Septuagint above 7000. But whereas we are there told that the Formation of Man was the last Act of the Creator, 'tis no where revealed in Scripture how long the Earth had existed before this last Creation, nor how long those five Days that preceeded it may be to be accounted; since we are elsewhere told, that in respect of the Almighty a thousand Years is as one Day, being equally no part of Eternity; Nor can it well be conceived how those Days should be to be understood of natural Days, since they are mentioned as Measures of Time before the Creation of the Sun, which was not till the Fourth Day.
No one among the English natural philosophers had ever said anything remotely as far away from the 'standard' biblical account; the one partial exception is Hooke, who had very tentatively and cautiously hinted that the multi-catastrophic scheme that he proposed might require a longer chronology than the biblical one allowed. 56 Here we might make two further historiographical interventions. First, we can certainly correct the judgement of Halley's fullest biographer, Alan Cook, that 'Then, as now, those who believed in the literal truth of the scriptures might have cavilled at Halley's approach, but it would have been quite acceptable to many in the Church of England and in particular to Tillotson and his latitudinarian followers.' 57 Cook-who surprisingly never cites Schaffer's seminal article-was both a brilliant practising scientist and a practising Anglican; his scepticism about accusations of heterodoxy directed at Halley led him to many astute judgements. 58 Unfortunately, this is not one of them. There is a world of difference between, say, Stillingfleet's preference for the chronology of the Septuagint over the Masoretic version of the Bible, and Halley's claim that salinity measurements may reveal that 'the World may be found much older than many have hitherto imagined.' 59 It is simply not true that 'many people at that time speculated that the world was eternal.' 60 Neither is it correct to claim, as has Sara Schechner, that 'in treating Scripture as allegorical, and searching for a naturalistic explanation of the Deluge, Halley was not original. To varying degrees, Burnet, Ray, and Hooke had preceded him; Whiston and others would follow.' 61 Burnet, Ray, Whiston and Newton had all used the exegetical technique of accommodation-the claim that Moses (or God working through him) had accommodated his language to the capacities of the Bible's contemporary auditors-to explain natural philosophical gaps in the text of Genesis and to claim that their readings were 'literal', as Protestant hermeneutics demanded: for them scripture was still true in a phenomenalist sense (even if Burnet's 'political' version of accommodationism landed him in hot water). 62 Hooke and Halley (the latter much more explicitly) went well beyond this method; as Poole has summarized, 'Hooke and Halley were developing a theory of catastrophism that had chronologically disconnected itself from biblical exegesis.' 63 To summarize: Halley developed an account of the world's history that was the most theologically idiosyncratic, and the most devolved from scriptural authority, of all the many natural philosophers, theologians and scholars who considered the issue in the wake of Thomas Burnet's Telluris theoria sacra (1681). However, the one theological idiosyncrasy that there is no evidence for him ever stretching to is belief in the eternity of the world.
CONCLUSION
Should we, then, return to the conclusions of the pre-Schaffer historiography, that Halley was an eternalist disingenuously misleading his audience for tactical reasons? 64 It seems to me that we should not. As the evidence presented above has been designed to show, there is a significant difference between two different heterodox opinions: the eternity of the world and the supra-biblical age of the world. Halley had what he thought were good geomorphological reasons for believing the latter. But although he went beyond anyone else in his conclusions, they were still attached to a biblical framework (in the broadest sense): he still spoke of a Flood, and of the allegorical meaning of the 'days' of Genesis. The same could never be said about eternalism. Neither is there any evidence that Halley D. Levitin 324 thought there were any good reasons from observation for believing the world eternal: he did say his proof of non-eternity was the first valid one, but this does not mean that he thought the case for eternalism was based on good evidence (in fact, it is difficult to see what might have constituted such evidence within the realms of astronomy and geomorphology in which the debates about the age of the world were being conducted).
Nonetheless, Halley does seem to have accommodated to circumstance to some extent, contra the uninhibited continuity at the heart of Schaffer's interpretation. On a general level, this is the case with the issue of eternalism: now that we have established the consistency of Halley's position after 1691-and recalling his silence on the matter before then-it does seem more likely that his arguments were developed in response to accusations (although that does not mean that they were held disingenuously). But more pertinent are the specifics of Halley's language, especially in the first publication generated by the lectures, that of 1692, where he spoke of 'designedly' working 'for the sake of those who will be apt to ask cui bono, and with whom Arguments drawn from Final Causes prevail much.' 65 This is surely an unambiguously conciliatory tone, referring to a well-known contemporary debate: where Bacon and Descartes had rejected the search for final causes, Boyle had encouraged it. 66 All of Halley's speculations about inhabitants inside the Earth were based on these teleological assumptions. He did not consider them invalid, but he also felt that natural philosophy could be done without them. The frustrated tone he adopted is probably a sign of the times: the early 1690s witnessed-partly in the wake of the Burnet controversy-a new fashion for rather staid statements of natural philosophical piety, most notably John Ray's The wisdom of God manifested in the works of the creation (1691). 67 Halley may well have been offering a resigned nod to this genre, and his comments on teleology may be a deliberate selfalignment with recent fashions. That he started making them in 1691 is neither a sign of dissimulation and radical discontinuity nor of complete continuity: rather, it reflects his realization that different tools were required for different tasks.
